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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5909
This working paper assesses cross-border economic 
integration in the Lower Congo region. It focuses on the 
Kinshasa–Brazzaville conurbation, which is projected to 
become Africa’s largest urban area by 2025, and is already 
serving as the gateway to large hinterlands. Despite 
their size and proximity, formal economic exchanges 
between the two cities are extremely limited. The 
volume of recorded passenger travel between Kinshasa 
and Brazzaville corresponds to about one-fifth of the 
volume of traffic between East and West Berlin during 
the time of the Berlin Wall, and formal trade volumes 
are derisorily small. As a consequence, the authors find 
evidence of statistically significant differences in retail 
prices, indicating unexploited scope for cross-river 
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arbitrage. Through a survey of firms, they find that local 
traders perceive substantial scope for increasing cross-
border economic activity if cross-river trade costs were 
reduced. Trade in locally produced goods and by small 
firms would especially benefit from such reductions. 
Existing high trade costs mainly result from a lack of 
competition in cross-river transport services, which are 
dominated by a duopoly of state-controlled operators. 
High administrative border costs, exacerbated by the 
presence of multiple government agencies at the border, 
act as a further obstacle. Liberalization of cross-river 
transport and customs reform could yield large economic 
benefits for local producers and consumers. 
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This report explores avenues for cross-border economic integration in the Lower Congo region. We 
seek  to  quantify  latent  trading  opportunities,  to  identify  the  principal  obstacles  and  to  formulate 
practical policy proposals. 
 
Bilateral official trade volumes between DRC and RC, recorded transit trade, and trade with Angola are 
all found to be small. Formal trade between DRC and RC is lower now than in the 1980s. However, we 
also find evidence of significant informal trading activity. 
 
Given  its  importance  in  demographic  and  economic  terms,  we  focus  on  the  Kinshasa-Brazzaville 
region – projected to become Africa’s largest conurbation by 2025, and serving as the gateway to large 
hinterlands. The link between their capitals turns out to be the main bottleneck for the expansion of 
economic relations between the two Congos. Small but concrete measures for drawing together such a 
“natural neighborhood” could open a viable path toward regional integration and offer a complement to 
more ambitious but institutionally demanding regional agreements. Moreover, policy interventions to 
facilitate  cross-border  exchanges  will  be  both  more  visible  and  better  enforceable  when  first 
implemented between the two capitals than if attempted in more remote places. Finally, facilitating 
transport and trade across Malebo Pool, the river basin separating Kinshasa and Brazzaville, will create 
competing supply routes to and from the Atlantic sea ports, which can act as a form of insurance for the 
case of interruption of either route. 
 
We find the costs of passenger and goods transport between Kinshasa and Brazzaville to be very high. 
A  return  trip  for  one  person  on  a  licensed  vessel  typically  costs  between  20  and  40  US  dollars, 
representing 40 to 80 percent of the average monthly income earned by Kinshasa residents. Trade costs 
for goods across Malebo Pool, a distance of 3.5 km, have been estimated between 3 and 30 percent of 
FOB values. Some two thirds of these costs consist of border delays and administrative costs. Border 
formalities for persons and goods are slow, complex and poorly administered. A multitude of agencies 
are present at DRC border crossings in direct violation of presidential orders, restricting their number to 
four. Bribery, incivility and violence are rife. 
 
Official passenger transport across Malebo Pool is controlled by a duopoly consisting of the two state-
owned transport operators. Private operators are licensed under a quota regime and subject to steep fees 
payable to the duopolists. We find that the price of crossing the river at Kisangani, a comparable setting 
without a national border, is about 300 times lower than that of crossing Malebo Pool, with the number 
of passenger crossings nearly 175 times larger on a per-capita basis. The volume of official passenger 
travel  between  Kinshasa  and  Brazzaville  corresponds  to  about  one  fifth  of  the  volume  of  traffic 
between East and West Berlin during the times of the Berlin Wall. 
 
We find that the high border costs and low traffic volumes are observed in parallel with significant 
market segmentation, suggesting a causal link. Our survey of retail prices in Kinshasa and Brazzaville 
shows that average prices of locally produced staple goods are largely equalized across markets within 
each  city.  When  comparing  prices  across  the  river,  however,  we  find  them  to  be  statistically 
significantly higher, on both sides, for goods shipped across the river. Our central estimate of this price 
margin  is  20  percent.  Despite  the  dominance  of  the  Matadi-Kinshasa-Brazzaville  transit  route 
according to official statistics, prices of overseas imports appear to be somewhat higher in Kinshasa 
than  in  Brazzaville.  Such  price  differentials  point  toward  considerable  unexploited  arbitrage 
opportunities.   6 
 
Using a purpose-designed company survey, we then estimate likely economic responses to changes in 
trade costs. We find the trade-cost elasticity of trade across Malebo Pool to be high, possibly even 
exceeding the value of 1. This means that cuts in the price of cross-Pool transport will stimulate a 
strong expansion of trade – so strong that it might even increase revenue for transport operators and for 
customs. Trade facilitation across Malebo Pool would promote mainly trade in locally produced goods 
and trade by small-scale producers. It thus holds particular promise for unlocking local productive 
potential.  
 
What can policy makers do? While large foreign-funded infrastructure projects exist on the drawing 
board, considerable uncertainty remains over their realization and future viability. Hence, we explore 
options for regulatory measures and small-scale donor interventions aimed at unleashing “bottom-up” 
local entrepreneurial activity. 
 
We  propose  that  customs  procedures  be  brought  in  line  with  existing  legal  prescriptions,  and  in 
particular  that  the  decreed  restriction  on  the  number  of  agencies  present  at  border  crossings  be 
enforced. Moreover, customs procedures ought to be simplified further, and fare structures should be 
made transparent. We also propose a liberalization of the cross-river transport market. Such measures 
would be comparatively cheap, would yield large gains to the general population, should be relatively 
easy to enforce given the proximity to the seats of government, and could have high symbolic value as 
evidence of political goodwill between the two nations.  
 
Our policy recommendations can be taken as complements to more general trade-facilitating reforms 
through  regional  trade  agreements  and  customs  reform,  as  proposed  in  the  World  Bank’s  recent 
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study. They also could be seen, at least in the short-to-medium term, as 
substitutes for the project of building a bridge to link Kinshasa and Brazzaville. Technical support, 
adjustment financing and some infrastructure funding from external donors could well be envisaged.   7 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This  report  explores  avenues  for  fruitful  regional  economic  integration  in  the  Lower  Congo 
region, meaning primarily the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Congo (RC). 
We  seek  to  quantify  the  latent  trading  opportunities  in  the  Lower  Congo  region,  to  identify  the 
principal  obstacles  to  their  realization  and  to  formulate  practical  policy  proposals  for  mutually 
advantageous cross-border integration. 
 
DRC  and  RC  offer  enormous  economic  potential.  Provided  that  the  political  situation  remains 
comparatively stable and the remaining security problems abate further, DRC and RC export sectors 
are poised to increase production. Such a prediction is of course fraught with risks, and given the 
turbulent  history  and  complex  ethnic  and  social  makeup  of  the  two  countries,  reversals  must  be 
considered a real possibility. To mention just three examples: the river Congo is considered by experts 
as the world’s largest untapped source of hydroelectric energy; the value of the rainforest as a carbon 
sink is bound to increase; and further discoveries may well beckon in the Kizomba oil field off the 
Congo estuary. Moreover, the DRC’s manufacturing base has been severely diminished by misrule 
under the Mobutu régime and by the ensuing wars, and some industrial activity is bound to resume if 
stability can be maintained in the DRC as well as in RC. Severe constraints including weak institutions, 
low human capital and a depleted capital stock all but rule out rapid industrialization, but the medium-
term economic forecast for the two Congos must surely be positive (see also Ulloa et al., 2009). 
 
This  report  offers  analysis  based  on  new  primary  data  and  develops  a  set  of  policy 
recommendations.  We  first  provide  a  descriptive  account  of  the  economies  of  the  Lower  Congo 
region. Such an exercise faces severe challenges due to an almost complete absence of systematic data, 
but we can nonetheless draw on some informative statistical information from international as well as 
local  sources.  In  Section  3,  we  then  present  and  analyze  two  data-collection  efforts  conducted 
specifically  for  the  present  report.  In  a  first  exercise,  we  compare  retail  prices  in  Kinshasa  and 
Brazzaville as a gauge for the degree of market integration. Our second approach consists of a set of 
structured interviews among trading firms in Kinshasa and Brazzaville. These interviews allow us to 
calculate some rough estimates of latent trading potential between the two cities, and they point us 
towards the main existing constraints on the realization of this potential. We then provide more general 
discussions  of  the  main  barriers  to  cross-border  integration  in  Section  4,  focusing  on  river-based 
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2.   CROSS-BORDER ECONOMIC EXCHANGES IN THE LOWER CONGO REGION 
 
 
2.1  The Economic Geography of the Lower Congo Region 
 
 
The  Lower Congo  region has  only  a  few economic centers.
3 The most apparent are the spatial 
concentration in the Kinshasa-Brazzaville area and  the coastal region. Henderson et al. (2009) have 
introduced an approach of measuring economic activity in developing countries by using night light 
images taken from satellites.
4 Figure 1 offers a three-dimensional representation of 2009 average night 
light intensities in Angola, CAR, DRC and RC. This map clearly shows the concentration of activity in 
Kinshasa-Brazzaville, Luanda, and along the Atlantic coast around the Congo delta (Soyo, Banana, 
Cabinda, Pointe Noire).
5  Apart from the Kinshasa -Brazzaville conurbation, interior regions appear 
largely empty of night lights. Centers of economic activity as estimated by this methodology have been 
stable between 1992 and 2009. 
 
 
Figure 1: Night Lights in the Lower Congo Region, 2009 
 
Note: Countries to the north-west of RC are not shown. 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this work, we define the Lower Congo Region as the provinces Bas-Congo, Kinshasa, and Bandundu in 
DRC, plus surrounding areas in RC and Angola. 
4 Their study notably found that DRC official statistics (as reported in the World Development Indicators) have significantly 
underestimated Congolese economic growth as compared to evi dence from tracking night light intensities. While, for the 
period 1992-2003, the official data report average real per-capita GDP growth of -0.26 percent, night lights imply positive 
growth of 0.24 percent.  The DRC is thus  the country with the world’s largest discrepancy between officially recorded 
growth  rates  and  growth  rates  inferred  from  night  lights.  This  points  towards  exceptionally  large  underreporting  of 
economic activity in the DRC. 
5 Although an effort was made to filter out night lights from off shore oil rigs along the Atlantic, the coastal lights are 
probably still somewhat inflated by the effect of offshore lights.   9 
Kinshasa-Brazzaville is now the third largest urban agglomeration in Africa, and predicted to 
become  the  largest  African  conurbation  and  the  world’s  11
th  largest  city  by  2015.  With  an 
international border running right across the Kinshasa-Brazzaville agglomeration, this regional hub of 
economic activity  is  the obvious focal  point for cross-border  exchanges between the two Congos. 
Figure 2 illustrates how, in spatial terms, the two capitals form a seamless urban unit, which has grown 
considerably over the last  two decades.  According to  UN statistics,  Kinshasa currently counts  8.8 
million and Brazzaville 1.3 million inhabitants; up from 3.6 million and 0.7 million, respectively, in 
1990. The United Nations (2010) expects the Kinshasa population to grow faster over the next 15 years 
than that of any other world metropolis, predicting a 2025 city size of 15.0 million. The population of 
Brazzaville is forecast to swell to 1.9 million.  
 
 
Figure 2: Night Lights in Kinshasa-Brazzaville, 1992 and 2009 
    
      1992                2009 
 
 
Kinshasa and its hinterland are critical to the DRC as a whole. Estimates presented in Table 1 
indicate that  the three provinces of Kinshasa, Bas-Congo and Bandundu account for 37 percent of 
DRC’s GDP and a full 56 percent of its official imports, even though only 28 percent of the national 
population lives in this area.
6 In terms of exports, however, the region is a relative minnow, with  only 
                                                 
6 Note the difference in population estimates: while the United Nations (2010) reports a figure of 8.8 million, the World 
Bank (2009a) works with an estimate of 6.6 million. This discrepancy highlights the margins of error attached to official 
statistics used in this study.   10 
17  percent  of  DRC  official  exports  originating  there.  This  pattern  is  particularly  pronounced  for 
Kinshasa, which accounts for over 21 percent of the nation’s GDP but a mere 0.8 percent of its exports. 
While  the  explanation  surely  lies  in  the  dominance  of  primary  products  in  DRC’s  exports  and 
Kinshasa’s  specialization  in  services,  these  numbers  point  toward  untapped  trade  potential  in  the 
western DRC. 
 
To sum up, the demographic and economic potential of Kinshasa and Brazzaville themselves, and their 
role as gateways for their economic hinterlands, demonstrate the importance of facilitating economic 




Table 1:   The Economic Weight of Western DRC, 2008  
Region  Population  GDP  Exports  Imports 
  mn people  % of DRC  USD bn  % of DRC  USD bn  % of DRC  USD bn  % of DRC 
Kinshasa   6.6  10.8  4.1  21.3  0.06  0.8  5.29  47.7 
Bas-Congo  3.5  5.8  1.8  9.4  0.95  13.7  0.49  4.4 
Bandundu  6.9  11.3  1.3  6.5  0.20  2.9  0.40  3.6 
Western 3  17.0  27.9  7.2  37.2  1.21  17.4  6.17  55.7 
DRC  61.0  100.0  19.2  100.0  6.94  100.0  11.08  100.0 




2.2  Trade in Goods and Services: DRC and RC 
 
 
Quantifying trade flows in the region is challenging, as both Congos have not submitted official 
trade statistics in many years. The DRC has not produced official trade statistics since 1978, while the 
RC has not submitted data to COMTRADE since 1995. Moreover, much (by some accounts, most) 
cross-border trade occurs informally; and erratic customs procedures, especially with respect to the 
estimation of shipment values, complicate the interpretation of those data that are available. However, 
upon  inspection  of  the  available  data,  we  believe  that  they  are  nonetheless  informative.  Formally 
declared trade, even if representing only a fraction of total trade, is important to the industrialized layer 
of the regional economy, and it represents one of the most important tax bases. 
 
The main gateway for overseas trade to and from the Western DRC is the port of Matadi, which 
accounts for some two thirds of imports in value terms and more than four fifths in terms of weight (see 
Table 2).
8 Certain shipments are sealed in Matadi to pass customs formalities  in Kinshasa. Matadi 
therefore accounts for a considerably larger share of physical entry into the DRC than reported in Table 
2. Kinshasa airport is also a significant entry point, accounting for some 10 percent of import values. 
 
                                                 
7  Recent  research  in  economic  geography  indeed  suggests  that  urbanization  is  a  key  engine  of  growth  in  developing 
countries,  and  that  limits  to  the  formation  of  urban  agglomerations  can  constitute  a  severe  obstacle  to  economic 
development (Deichmann et al., 2008; Brülhart and Sbergami, 2009). 
8 We use data for 2007, as these statistics are more complete than those we received for 2008 and 2009. Table 2 most likely 
underreports the share of the ports of Boma and Banana/Kinlau. According to tonnage data for 2008 obtained from the 
logistics company SDV-Agetraf, the volume of imports entering through Boma and Banana/Kinl au amounted to 9 percent 
and 13 percent respectively of the volume of imports entering through Matadi.   11 
 
Table 2:   Main Entry Points for Imports in the Western DRC, 2007 
Customs office: 
% share of imports in terms of 
value  weight  transactions 
Matadi  65.05  84.17  65.20 
Boma  0.02  0.02  0.06 
Kinlau (fuel port)  0.54  0.65  0.32 
Banana  1.22  0.16  0.57 
Kimpangu (Angolan border)  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Kinshasa Port (ONATRA freight port)  15.92  10.50  10.68 
Kinshasa Airport  9.47  0.27  15.82 
Kinshasa Beach Ngobila (ONATRA ferry port)  0.07  0.11  0.28 
Other Kinshasa ports  7.72  4.12  7.07 
Total  100  100  100 
Source: own computations, based on data from DGDA. 
 
 
Almost no DRC imports from RC find their way into official trade statistics. According to the data 
summarized in Table 2, the two customs offices likely to clear imports  originating in neighboring 
countries, the ferry port Kinshasa Beach (RC) and Kimpangu (Angola), record next to no imports.
9 
Only ONATRA’s Kinshasa freight port declares a significant volume of imports, accounting for some 
16 percent of the value of Western DRC imports. Given that there is no formal upriver trade (with CAR 
and Cameroon) left, this points towards non-negligible formal imports from Brazzaville. These imports 
could be of two kinds: overseas imports that have been unloaded at Pointe Noire (RC) or Douala 
(Cameroon) and transited through Brazzaville, or imports of goods produced in RC. However, we 
could  obtain  detailed  trade  data  only  for  Kinshasa  Beach,  not  for  the  freight  port.  Detailed  data 
obtained  from  DGDA  show  only  five  small  RC-originated  shipments  recorded  for  all  of  2007, 
representing but a fraction of a percent of Western DRC imports. Recorded volumes of imports that 
have transited through RC are somewhat larger, but also account for well under one percent of Western 
DRC imports. The main recorded DRC import goods from RC are fuel, vehicles, building materials, 
cement and mineral water.
10 
 
                                                 
9 For Kimpangu, the 2007 statistics report a single shipment (USD 660 worth of beans). Most trade with Angola clearly is 
informal and therefore goes unreported. For Kinshasa Beach, see also Table 3. 
10 Some DRC imports from RC are not recorded by DRC customs but by the port authority in Brazzaville (see Table 5).  
Table 3: Composition of RC Imports from DRC, 2007 
 
Products  RC imports from DRC  RC worldwide imports  DRC share in worldwide 
RC imports 
product shares of RC 
imports from DRC 
HS code  Description 
weight (t)  value        
(USD 1,000)  weight (t)  value        
(USD 1,000)  weight (%)  value (%)  weight (%)  value (%) 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)=100*(1)/(3)  (6)=100*(2)/(4)  (7)  (8) 
   All goods  79,164  17,968  2,703,483  1,597,524  2.93  1.12  100.00  100.00 
2710191  Gasoline (diesel)  6,115  4,809  98,249  107,710  6.22  4.46  7.72  26.76 
2710113  Gasoline ("super")  4,032  3,827  4,262  15,383  94.60  24.87  5.09  21.30 
2523290  Cement  58,346  2,571  319,856  29,620  18.24  8.68  73.70  14.31 
2710117  Gasoline (standard)  1,943  1,578  2,070  15,920  93.86  9.91  2.45  8.78 
7010920  Glass bottles  855  753  1,514  1,360  56.46  55.34  1.08  4.19 
8413810  Pumps  11  644  586  13,507  1.84  4.77  0.01  3.59 
1101001  Wheat flour  3,450  539  34,734  14,651  9.93  3.68  4.36  3.00 
9406000  Prefabricated buildings  45  528  895  7,714  5.00  6.85  0.06  2.94 
1511900  Refined palm oil  878  369  18,128  11,136  4.84  3.32  1.11  2.06 
7312109  Iron/steel wires/cables  23  255  389  3,616  5.83  7.06  0.03  1.42 
1006301  Milled rice  679  138  18,823  6,365  3.61  2.17  0.86  0.77 
8413910  Pump parts  63  104  194  8,503  32.39  1.22  0.08  0.58 
9015800  Surveying instruments  52  97  179  6,975  29.03  1.39  0.07  0.54 
3401110  Soap  27  84  1,139  1,013  2.34  8.28  0.03  0.47 
3926909  Misc. plastic goods  22  67  260  1,031  8.61  6.49  0.03  0.37 
2102100  Active yeasts  60  66  466  838  12.90  7.92  0.08  0.37 
8711900  Motorcycles  7  58  41  101  16.88  57.29  0.01  0.32 
8409990  Engine parts  9  56  641  2,585  1.40  2.18  0.01  0.31 
0402290  Powdered milk  67  54  498  834  13.38  6.49  0.08  0.30 
2905110  Methanol  20  52  496  654  4.03  8.00  0.03  0.29 
Source: RC trade ministry.  
Recorded RC imports from the DRC are only slightly more important, amounting to some 1.12 
percent of total RC imports in value terms. Table 5 presents data obtained from the RC authorities and 
shows that imports from the DRC account for more than 10 percent of formal RC imports in only three 
goods: gasoline, glass bottles and motorcycles (see column 6 of Table 3). These data most likely tell us 
more about which types of goods are imported formally than about which types of goods are imported 
from  DRC, as  most cross-border trade simply seems  to  escape the regular control  of the customs 
authorities. The overall figures are undoubtedly a large understatement of the true trade share and 
points toward considerable potential for an expansion of formal trade. 
 
Officially recorded trade flows between the DRC and the RC are largely limited to transit trade 
flows, which seem to be increasing. According to official data supplied by RC authorities the weight 
of transit imports from DRC was about three times higher in 2007 than in the two preceding years, and 
transit trade seems to have increased further since. Briceño-Garmendia and Foster (2009) estimate the 
share of RC imports that transit through the DRC at some 8.6 percent. The data in Table 4, based on 
DRC statistics, also show some signs of a revival in transit trade since 2009. Official data certainly 
underreport  the  importance  transit  trade.  The  large  informal  flows  of  clothing  and  textiles  from 
Brazzaville to Kinshasa, for instance, mostly originate in West Africa and arrive through Pointe Noire 
or Douala in Brazzaville. These large informal flows do not appear in any statistics. 
 
 
Table 4: DRC-RC Transit Trade, 2007-2010 
      2007  2008  2009  2010* 
Value (USD 1,000) 
DRC-RC  22,693  67,312  89,401  106,978 
RC-DRC  0  0  n.a.  17 
Weight (tons) 
DRC-RC  22,168  52,436  84,129  106,256 
RC-DRC  0  0  4,000  11,160 
Shipments 
DRC-RC  370  797  1,543  2,022 




Formal transit flows predominantly run from Kinshasa to Brazzaville (see Table 4). Brazzaville is 
partially  supplied  through  Matadi  and  Kinshasa  due  to  the  poor  condition  of  the  rail  and  road 
infrastructure in RC. Rail freight fares from Pointe Noire to Brazzaville are 90 to 165 percent higher 
than  average  tariffs  per  ton-kilometer  charged  by  other  African  rail  concessions  (Pozzo  di  Borgo, 
2008), and the road can only be passed during the dry season. There are also  reports of sporadic 
military threats from former rebels. Work is being undertaken to repair the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville 
road. This  is  scheduled for completion in 2012. The  RC government  is  furthermore preparing the 
privatization and repair of the railway from the coast to the capital. 
 
Port freight data point to  customs  underreporting  but confirm general  patterns  of DRC-RC 
trade. Volumes at the port of Brazzaville had peaked in 1984 with 590,000 tons (of which 51 percent 
was wood from upriver) but amounted to a mere 373,000 tons in 2009 (of which 8 percent was wood, 
see Table 5). At the same time, the volume of official imports from the DRC to the RC, and data on 
transit flows through the DRC only add up to 101,000 tons, compared to the 343,000 tons of incoming 
traffic from Kinshasa reported by Brazzaville port. More than half of trade handled by the port of 
Brazzaville is in fuel and cement. The volume of shipments into Brazzaville exceeds that of shipments 
out  of  Brazzaville  by  a  factor  of  about  ten.  Outbound  shipments  may  suffer  from  particular   14 
underreporting bias. According to information from the Kinshasa port authority (ONATRA) as well, 
the tonnage shipped from Kinshasa to Brazzaville exceeds that going from Brazzaville to Kinshasa, 
although according to their statistics by only around 40 percent. Hence, port data in Brazzaville and 
Kinshasa  support our  finding of the current  dominance of the Matadi-Kinshasa-Brazzaville supply 
route relative to the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville-Kinshasa route. 
 
 
Table 5:  Composition of  Inbound and Outbound Goods Traffic at the Port of Brazzaville, 2009 
  From Kinshasa to Brazzaville  From Brazzaville to Kinshasa 
  Tons  %  Tons  % 
Fuel  131,915  38.4  17,981  61.0 
Cement  56,675  16.5  530  1.8 
Flour  30,154  8.8  145  0.5 
Wood  26,977  7.9  -  - 
Foodstuffs  26,297  7.7  146  0.5 
Building  materials 
and gravel 
7,860  2.3  2,253  7.6 
Mineral water  6,282  1.8  472  1.6 
Vegetable oil  6,114  1.8  -  - 
Vehicles  4,912  1.4  5,464  18.5 
Soap  4,340  1.3  -  - 
Containers  2,991  0.9  76  0.3 
Empty packaging  899  0.3  181  0.6 
Sugar  756  0.2  0  0.0 
Sheet metal  505  0.1  0  0.0 
Chemicals  487  0.1  10  0.0 
Ground nuts  483  0.1  -  - 
Corrugated iron  314  0.1  5  0.0 
Other  35,372  10.3  2,237  7.6 
Total  343,333  100.0  29,500  100.0 




2.3  Passenger Traffic 
 
 
Passenger traffic on the river is dominated by traffic across Malebo Pool, the river basin between 
Kinshasa  and  Brazzaville,  with  the  total  number  of  fare-paying  river  crossings  estimated  at 
around 212,000 annually.
11 Official data from the port authority in Brazzaville and from ONATRA in 
Kinshasa are presented in Table 6. Less than 5 percent of passengers arrive from or travel to upriver 
destinations. Oddly, according to these statistics, the number of passengers who arrive at Brazzaville 
                                                 
11 According to estimates given to us by ONATRA, their ferry “Matadi” carries some 600 paying passengers per average 
workday. This would correspond to around 190,000 passengers per year. As some additional travelers cross on the much 
smaller CNTF ferry and on private speed boats, a  reasonable estimate of the total number of fare-paying passengers 
crossing annually between the two capitals may be found by doubling the number of inbound passengers recorded by the 
port of Brazzaville, i.e. some 212,000 crossings.   15 
port is about twice as large as the number of passengers who depart from Brazzaville – again pointing 
to considerable misreporting. 
 
 
Table 6:   Inbound and Outbound Passenger Traffic at the Ports of Brazzaville and Kinshasa, 2009 
   Passengers  %  Passengers  % 
Data by Brazzaville port:  To Brazzaville  From Brazzaville 
Crossing from/to Kinshasa  101,510  95.6  50,733  94.8 
From/to upriver  4,620  4.4  2,787  5.2 
Total  106,130  100  53,520  100 
Data by ONATRA:  To Brazzaville  From Brazzaville 
Crossing from/to Kinshasa  141,394  99.6  62,611  99.4 
To/from upriver  520  0.4  400  0.6 
Total  141,914  100  63,011  100 
Officially recorded passengers only. Sources Port of Brazzaville (PABPS) and ONATRA. 
 
 
The  overall  number  of  passenger  crossings,  around  700,000  annually,  is  extremely  small 
compared  the  size  of  the  two  cities.  According  to  ONATRA,  fare-paying  passengers  represent 
somewhat less than a third of all crossings, as disabled travelers are exempt from paying the fare and 
many of them make a living from informal trading. This leads us to estimate for the total annual 
number of trips across Malebo Pool in the region of 700,000. As we show in Section 4, this volume of 
traffic,  scaled  to  city  sizes,  is  some  175  times  smaller  than  the  river-crossing  passenger  traffic  in 
Kisangani. It is also around five times smaller than the volume of passenger traffic between East and 









How large is the potential for trade expansion across Malebo Pool? Compared to the two cities’ 
size,  economic  importance  and  role  as  gateway  to  the  Lower  Congo  region,  economic  exchanges 
between Kinshasa and Brazzaville are extremely limited. Such limited observed trade could be the 
result of either substantial barriers to trade or a lack of tradable products. In order to investigate the 
reasons behind this limited trade, we assess the extent of existing and potential cross-border economic 
interactions  in  Kinshasa-Brazzaville  using  primary  data  collected  for  the  purpose.  We  collect  and 
compare retail price data on both sides of the river, testing for symptoms of market segmentation in the 
form of systematic price differentials that would indicate the existence of trade barriers. In addition, we 
analyze  the  results  of  structured  interviews  carried  out  with  trading  firms  in  both  capitals  for  a 
qualitative  assessment  of  barriers  to  trade,  and  for  an  estimation  of  the  latent  potential  for  trade 
expansion. 
 
                                                 
12 In 1988, there were some 1.9 million passenger crossings between East and West Berlin – about one crossing per three 
inhabitants  of  the  Berlin  metropolitan  area.  The  700,000 estimated  crossings  across  Malebo  pool  represent  about  one 
crossing per 15 inhabitants of the Kinshasa-Brazzaville conurbation.   16 
 
3.1  Price Survey 
 
 
Design of Study 
 
A systematic difference in retail prices for identical goods in two markets is probably the most 
reliable  indicator  of  barriers  to  trade  between  those  markets.  Absent  physical  and  regulatory 
barriers to trade, price differences will be arbitraged away. This is why we look at prices first. 
 
For a rigorous comparison of prices on both sides of the river we selected 57 precisely defined 
products  that  allowed  us  to  collect  and  compare  prices  for  “identical”  products.  Even  on 
Congolese markets, where the degree of product differentiation is considerably lower than in high-
income economies, great care must be taken to compare like with like, i.e. to define meticulously the 
type and quantity of the good whose price is to be recorded.  The 57 goods were chosen in close 
consultation  with  local  experts  so  as  to  offer  a  representative  sample  of  Congolese  consumption 
baskets. The list of products and summary price statistics are given in Appendix 2. 
 
Price  data  were  collected  carefully  from  representative  samples  of  retail  markets  in  both 
Kinshasa  and  Brazzaville.  We  relied  on  a  local  expert  who  recorded  prices  using  a  consistent 
methodology to make prices comparable among vendors, as prices are commonly determined through 
bargaining. Four large retail markets were selected in each city, two in the respective city center and 
two in the suburbs.
13 We obtained some complementary price data from the RC Planning Ministry, 
collected in Brazzaville over the same time period as our own price data, and we consider these data 
points as our “ninth sample market”. Where possible, prices were recorded for each product from up to 
three vendors per market.
14 Some of the Brazzaville prices were obtained from wholesalers, and are 
thus not directly comparable to the prices recorded at the retail level. All prices were  recorded in local 
currency, between 26 August and 3 September 2010.  We asked vendors for the origin of their goods, 
allowing us to classify the goods as  locally produced, imported across the river, and imported from 
overseas. For our estimations, prices are converted into US dollars at the exchange rates prevailing 
locally in that period.
15 Finally, for goods sold in known weight units, we expressed all prices in terms 





We use  panel data regression  methods to estimate systematic price differentials  for identical 
products across markets. By using this technique, we can formally test the hypothesis that observed 
price differences across markets are systematic – i.e. “statistically significant” –, meaning that they 
cannot be explained by random price variation among individual vendors due to a myriad of reasons 
such as the time of day, the vendor’s available stock at the time of the transaction, the precise quality of 
the  item(s)  sold,  the  vendor’s  location  within  a  market,  or  the  vagaries  of  the  haggling  process. 
Moreover,  we  can  control  for  good-specific  “fixed  effects”,  meaning  that  price  differences  across 
markets are estimated by using only differences within individual products, and thus by comparing like 
                                                 
13 Kinshasa center : Marché Central and Gambela; Kinshasa suburbs : Matadi-Kimbala and Liberté; Brazzaville center : 
Total and Poto-Poto; Brazzaville suburbs : Mikalou and Mongali. 
14 We could not collect prices for each good in each market. While a balance d sample would comprise 1,539 observations 
(57 goods * 9 markets * 3 vendors), our maximum sample size is 970. 
15 1 USD = 910 Congolese francs; 1 USD = 511 CFA francs.   17 
with like.
16 We always include a binary control variable for prices collected from wholesalers, as they 
are not directly comparable to the prices collected from retail vendors. 
 
Our analysis of prices in Kinshasa and Brazzaville retail markets points towards the existence of 
significant trade barriers. Imports from across Malebo Pool are consistently estimated to be more 
expensive than corresponding local products. Our most precisely measured differential, estimated over 
DRC exports to RC, is 20 percent. The detailed estimation results are shown in Table 7.  
 
Price differences cannot be attributed to differences in local producer and distribution costs. This 
can be ascertained by comparing the prices of staple goods produced and sold locally on either side of 
the river without being traded across the border.
17 If we were to observe a significant price difference 
for such goods, this would point to differences in economic conditions (systematically different 
producer and/or local distribution costs) combined with barriers to cross -river arbitrage. We therefore 
regress the log of observed prices of locally produced and locally sold goods on the binary variable 
Brazzaville, which is set to one for prices collected in Brazzaville and to zero for prices collected in 
Kinshasa, plus a fixed effect for each good and a binary variable that is set to one if the price in 
question is recorded from a wholesaler. The estimated regression coefficient shown in column (1) of 
Table 7 suggests that prices for the same locally produced good on average are 13 percent higher in 
Brazzaville than in Kinshasa. Importantly, however, this effect is not statistically significant, i.e. we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that this difference falls within the margins of random price variations 
among vendors and that prices are in fact equalized across the two cities. Hence, our data do not 
suggest  there  to  be  a  systematic  discrepancy  in  retail  prices  for  local  produce  in  Brazzaville  and 
Kinshasa, implying that the underlying economic structures are very similar. 
 
Shipping local goods the 3.5 kilometers across Malebo Pool from Kinshasa to Brazzaville is found 
to add more than a fifth to the retail price of these goods. This can be seen by considering only 
locally produced goods but including also products that are exported across the river. Since our sample 
of prices includes no goods that are produced in RC and sold in both Brazzaville and Kinshasa, we 
focus on goods produced in DRC and sold in both cities. Our sample includes ten such products.
18 The 
estimates shown in column (2) of Table  7 provide evidence of market segmentation: DRC-produced 
goods are sold at a 20 percent premium in Brazzaville relative to their retail price in Kinshasa. This 
estimate is highly statistically significant   and thus provides  evidence of substantial trade barriers 
between the two cities. 
 
At the same time, shipping goods from Brazzaville to Kinshasa also raises their prices. Again, our 
data sample contains no goods that are produced in RC and sold in both Brazzaville and Kinshasa, and 
therefore does not allow us to estimate the margin at which RC-produced goods are sold in Kinshasa 
via fixed effects. We therefore focus on products whose prices are expressed relative to their weight 
(i.e. per kilogram) and employ random effects estimation that take also differences between goods into 
                                                 
16 In order to allow us to interpret estimated regression coefficients as percentage differences, we transform prices (the 
dependent variable) into their natural logarithms. Thereby, any coefficient on a binary explanatory variable, D_est, is related 
to the implied percentage difference, D_%, through the following function D_% = 100 * (e
D_est – 1). 
17 Our sample goods that are produced and consumed locally on both sides of the river are cassava flour, cement, eggs, 
green beans, mineral water, palm oil, plantain, potato, sugar cane, sweet potato, tomato and wheat flour. 
18 These products are body lotion, butter, cement, cooking oil, mineral water, palm oil, plastic chairs, sugar cane, washing 
powder and wheat flour. Four of these goods also appear on the list of locally -produced-and-locally-sold products (cement, 
mineral water, palm oil, sugar cane, wheat flour). This is possible because the Brazzaville price data distinguish between 
locally produced varieties and imported varieties. Hence, for instance, separate prices are recorded for cement produced in 
Loutete (RC) and cement imported from Lukala (DRC).   18 
account. While this somewhat more involved approach yields rather imprecise estimates, the estimation 
suggests that trade costs also raise the price at which RC goods are being sold in Kinshasa.
19 
 
Significant price differentials are also found when we consider goods imported from overseas. 
Results taking account of all our sample goods, including overseas imports, are shown in columns (3) 
to (8) of Table 7. Several findings emerge: 
  Brazzaville prices systematically appear to be higher than Kinshasa prices, across the range of 
regression specifications (Table 7, columns 3 to 8). 
  Overseas  imports  are  38  to  67  percent  more  expensive  than  their  domestically  produced 
equivalents. (Table 7, columns 4 to 8). This difference is not a perfect measure of trade costs, 
but it is suggestive of continuing high overseas import costs, confirming estimates reported 
elsewhere (World Bank, 1991 and 2010c). 
  There is no systematic difference in prices of RC-produced goods and their DRC-produced 
equivalents,  on  a  given  market.  Coefficients  on  the  binary  variable  RC_good  are  never 
statistically significant (Table 7, columns 5 to 8). 
  Average prices are equalized within cities: no individual market offers systematically higher or 
lower prices than any of the other sample markets. Hence, market segmentation is diagnosed 
only between the two capitals, not within them.
20 
 
Overseas imports appear on average to be sold more cheaply in Brazzaville than in Kinshasa. 
This is implied by negative coefficient on the interaction term given by the product of the binary 
variables Brazzaville and Overseas_good (Table 7, columns 7 and 8). On the face of it, this finding 
runs  counter  to  the  dominance  of  the  Matadi-Kinshasa-Brazzaville  route  over  the  Pointe  Noire-
Brazzaville-Kinshasa route suggested by the official data (see Section 2.2). One explanation could be 
that this result is too imprecise to be afforded much weight. Indeed, in one specification, the relevant 
coefficient is not statistically significant, and in the other specification it is borderline significant (at the 
90 percent confidence level). However, in view of the high costs of crossing Malebo Pool, prices for 
import goods would be expected to be higher in Brazzaville than in Kinshasa if Matadi indeed were the 
main entry point. That we find the reverse pattern, even though somewhat imprecisely estimated, is 
quite remarkable and another pointer towards large undocumented imports to Brazzaville via Pointe 
Noire  and  Gabon/Cameroon,  and  attendant  unexploited  scope  for  transit  trade  to  Kinshasa  via 
Brazzaville. 
 
Overall, our results suggest that trade facilitation across Malebo Pool would lower prices in both 
cities, with particular scope for falls in import prices in Kinshasa and for falls in prices of local 
produce in Brazzaville. The observed price differentials imply significant trade barriers between the 
two cities but not within them. Given the proximity of the two markets, this implies considerable 
potential for intensified arbitrage through cross-Pool trade.  
                                                 
19 Details on the random effects estimations can be obtained from the authors. 
20 Due to space limitations, the estimations with market fixed effects are not shown in Table 7.  
Table 7: Price Differences Between Kinshasa and Brazzaville – Panel Regression Estimates 
 











   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Brazzaville  0.13  0.20***  0.09  0.09*  0.09  0.05  0.16**  0.22*** 
0.11  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.05 
Overseas_good 
         0.34***  0.34***  0.33***  0.41***  0.46*** 
         0.01  0.01  0.01  0.07  0.06 
RC_good 
           0.01  0.01    -0.09 
           0.10  0.10    0.08 
Brazzaville * 
Overseas_good 
               -0.12  -0.17* 
               0.11  0.09 
Brazzaville * RC_good 
                 (not 
identified)
†                  
Wholesale_price  -0.22***  -0.15***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.16***  -0.12***  -0.17***  -0.16*** 
0.05  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03 
Fixed effects for goods  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Random effects for goods  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  no 
Fixed effects for markets  no  no  no  no  no  yes  no  no 
Within-R
2  0.06  0.13  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.07  0.08 
N  356  283  970  970  970  970  970  970 
Notes: heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in italics; */**/***: significant at the 90/95/99% level; 
†: effect not identified in fixed-






3.2  Survey of Trading Firms 
 
 
Design of the Study 
 
In order to estimate the potential for trade expansion generally, and across Malebo Pool more 
specifically,  we  conducted  a  series  of  structured  interviews  with  firms  in  Kinshasa  and 
Brazzaville in April-June 2010. The interviewed firms had to respond to a sole criterion: that they 
are, or were in the past, engaged in cross-border economic activities, be it in the form of trade in 
goods or in the form of passenger transport. Conditional on this criterion, we sought to cover as 
representative  a  sample  of  firms  as  possible,  covering  the  full  spectrum  of  relevant  economic 
activities.  
 
We obtained interview answers from 57 firms, 17 of which are manufacturers, 19 are based in 
Brazzaville, and 12 are informal.
21 The average sample firm has 238 workers. However, the size 
distribution is highly skewed, the median being 14 workers, and 16 sample fi rms being one-person 
organizations. Only four of the 57 firms are engaged in the transport of passengers, which means 
that our statistical analysis of the survey answers will have to be confined to analyzing trade in 
goods. Sample firms were presented with an identical 72-item questionnaire, containing questions 
on the existing structure of the business as well as hypothetical assessments of the impact of trade 
liberalizing measures on their activities. Interviewees were promised strict confidentiality, which is 
why we present no information in this report that could be traced to individual firms. 
 
 
Results: Quantitative Analysis 
 
Firms overwhelmingly expect to increase the volume of international trade in response to a 
fall in costs of importing and exporting. We came to this insight by asking firms to estimate the 
medium-term percentage impact on the volume of their cross-border trade of four hypothetical 
scenarios: 
-  a 50-percent fall in transport costs on exports/imports to/from all foreign markets, 
-  a 50-percent fall in administrative trade costs on exports/imports to/from all foreign markets, 
-  a 50-percent fall in border delays impeding exports/imports to/from all foreign markets, 
-  a 50-percent fall in total trade costs on exports/imports to/from Kinshasa/ Brazzaville. 
Table 8 presents mean and median projections in response to our hypothetical questions. Given the 
small sample sizes and strongly skewed responses in some cases, we consider medians to be more 
informative than means. Since most firms provided answers only to the questions that touched on 
their already existing activities, we state the number of respondents in each cell.
22 
 
The main constraints on international trade flows appear to be due to the cost of physical 
transport and to administrative costs, with an elasticity of trade volumes to trade costs of 
about 0.5.  All but one our sample firms expected to increase the volume of cross-border trade in 
response to a fall in trade costs.
23 Although many firms complain about delays due to inadequate 
                                                 
21 Since the number of formal firms is limited and the distribution of informal firms is unknown, rigorously randomized 
sampling  was  not  possible.  We  therefore  relied  on  local  consultants  to  approach  a  representative  selection  of 
organizations, and we are satisfied that the sample thus retained, while inevitably somewhat ad hoc, does not suffer 
from any systematic selection bias. 
22 We also asked our sample firms to predict the effect of a fall in the costs of upriver trade with Bangui, but only few 
firms replied to this and most of them stated that this would make no difference to their activities. 
23 The sole negative projection was made by one of the private suppliers of rapid passenger crossings across Malebo 
Pool (“canotier”), who predicted that a 50-percent reduction in general costs of passenger transport would halve his 
volume of passengers. This points to the existence of potential losses from cross-border liberalization by firms currently 
benefitting from the existing restrictions.   21 
port facilities and inefficient customs procedures, the main constraints on international trade flows 
appear to be due to transport costs and administrative costs. Our survey evidence suggests that a 50-
percent reduction in either of these costs would boost the volume of trade by about a quarter, thus 
implying an elasticity of about one-half. 
 
Table 8: Predicted Trade Expansion – Cross Tabulation 
 
  Percentage increase in trade volume predicted  




costs  Border delays 
All exports 
Mean  102  79  12.5 
Median  37.5  25  5 
N  12  12  10 
All imports 
Mean  31  39  17 
Median  20  25  10 
N  36  39  29 
Trade  
Kinshasa → Brazzaville 
Mean  51 
Median  40 
N  19 
Trade 
Brazzaville → Kinshasa 
Mean  41 
Median  12.5 
N  8 
 
 
A  general  fall  in  trade  costs  would  stimulate  DRC  and  RC  exports  more  than  it  would 
stimulate their imports. Interestingly, the results shown in Table 8 suggest that the sensitivity of 
trade  volumes  to  trade  costs  is  somewhat  larger  for  exports  than  for  imports.  Hence,  trade 
facilitation would be beneficial for both countries’ balance of trade. 
 
The  strongest  predicted  response  to  lower  trade  costs  is  for  exports  from  Kinshasa  to 
Brazzaville, with an implied elasticity of 0.8. A halving of trade costs is predicted by our sample 
firms to trigger a 40-percent increase in the volume of trade. Hence, a reduction in trade barriers 
would pay particularly rich dividends if applied between the two capital cities. Table 8, however, 
also suggests that there is greater latent potential for exports from Kinshasa to Brazzaville than in 
the other direction. 
 
Our findings imply that cuts in tariffs and transport prices could be revenue neutral. The true 
potential for trade expansion comes from three sources: expansion of existing trading relationships, 
opening of new trade routes by existing operators, and entry of new operators.  By considering 
almost exclusively the first source of trade changes, our approach implies a certain status-quo bias 
and must therefore be considered as yielding lower-bound estimates. In view of this, our computed 
trade elasticities of up to 0.8 (for Kinshasa-Brazzaville trade) can be taken as pointers to large latent 
potential  for  trade  expansion.  Importantly,  given  the  in-built  downward  bias,  our  estimated 
elasticities may well be compatible with true elasticities of one, meaning that any cut in trade costs 
would be offset by an equiproportional increase in the volume of trade. If the true elasticity were 
even larger than unity, something that appears entirely possible given our estimates, tariff cuts could 
even yield increases in tariff revenue. 
 
Regression analysis offers a more rigorous evaluation of survey responses and confirms our 
findings based on simple cross tabulations. The summary statistics reported in Table 8 do not 
allow  us  to  test  whether  observed  differences  in  projected  trade  responses  are  statistically   22 
significant or whether they are more likely to be the result of random sampling variation. This is 
why we again resort to regression analysis, which allows us to formally explore hypotheses about 
average  trade  responses.  Our  dependent  variable  in  this  analysis  is  the  percentage  increase  in 
predicted trade volumes for a 50-percent fall in trade costs. As explanatory variables we consider 
whether the  firm  in  question is  based in  Brazzaville (as  opposed to  being based in  Kinshasa), 
whether it is formally registered, whether it is a local manufacturing firm (as opposed to be a pure 
importer  or  exporter),  whether  the  trade  cost  considered  is  a  fall  in  transport  costs  or  in 
administrative costs (as opposed to a reduction in customs delays), and whether the trade flow in 
question is an export (as opposed to an import). In addition to these binary variables, we consider 
the size of the firm (in hundreds of workers) as a continuous regressor. Since firm size is not known 
for all sample firms, we show regressions with and without inclusion of that variable. 
 
 
Table 9: Predicted Trade Expansion – Regression Estimates 
 
Independent variables: 
Dependent variable = 
percentage increase of X predicted for 50-percent fall in trade costs 
X = total international trade  X = Kinshasa ↔ Brazzaville trade 
Brazzaville-based firm  -1.7  -3.9  37.7**  60.1** 
14.0  14.1  17.2  24.9 
Formal firm  25.6**  13.5  8.2  8.4 
12.44  14.2  19.1  20.7 
Manufacturing firm  -3.5  -4.8  133.0***  67.6** 
12.7  11.4  25.2  31.5 
Fall in transport cost 
26.5**  33.7***     
11.6  12.1     
Fall in admin. trade cost  31.6***  34.4***     
11.9  11.2     
Exports  37.9**  39.7**     
17.7  18.4     
Firm size  0.2    -5.3***   
1.1    1.5   
Kinshasa → Brazzaville      5.1  -5.9 
    14.5  21.6 
Constant  -13.5  -3.5  2.3  -4.5 
20.0  20.1  20.0  22.7 
R
2  0.11  0.12  0.59  0.18 
N  129  138  26  27 
Notes: firm size in terms of hundreds of workers; heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in italics; */**/***: 
significant at the 90/95/99% level 
 
 
We again find that a general fall in trade costs would stimulate exports more than it would 
stimulate imports. The first two columns of Table 9 report regression results for total international 
trade, i.e. primarily overseas trade via Matadi and Pointe Noire. The coefficient on Exports, a binary 
variable set to one for predicted exports and to zero for predicted imports, shows that 50-percent 
reduction in external trade costs would stimulate Congolese exports up to 40 percentage points 
more than it would increase the volume of imports. With exports being more elastic relative to trade 
costs than imports, trade liberalization would serve not only to increase the volume of international 
trade but also to improve the trade balance of DRC and RC. The regression estimates furthermore   23 
suggest  that  Kinshasa  and  Brazzaville  firms  are  not  significantly  different  in  their  predicted 
responses to lower trade costs. No such differences appear between manufacturing firms and pure 
trading  firms,  and  between  large  and  small  firms,  either.  The  regression  analysis  confirms  the 
finding of Table 7 that transport costs and administrative trade costs are bigger obstacles to trade 
than border delays, but the difference between those two is not statistically significant. Finally, we 
find some evidence that formal firms are more responsive to falls in overseas trade costs than 
informal firms. 
 
Trade facilitation across Malebo Pool appears to hold particular promise for promoting local 
manufacturing and small-scale currently informal activity. In the last two columns of Table 9, 
we concentrate on trade flows across Malebo Pool, without distinguishing different types of trade 
facilitation. Unlike in the case of total trade, formal firms do not stand to expand their activities 
more than informal ones in response to trade liberalization across Malebo Pool. The estimated 
regression  coefficient  on  firm  size  even  suggests  that  smaller  firms  anticipate  expanding  their 
activities proportionally more than larger firms, perhaps because larger firms are already better able 
to  circumvent  trade  barriers.  Finally,  we  find  very  large  and  statistically  significant  regression 
coefficients on the binary variable “manufacturing firm”. This means that local producers anticipate 
much larger scope for inter-city trade expansion than pure trading firms. 
 
The predicted impact of trade facilitation across Malebo Pool is larger for Brazzaville-based 
firms than for Kinshasa-based firms. This is not surprising given that Kinshasa is a considerably 
larger market, and hence the scope for cross-border expansion relative to their home market is 
significantly larger for RC firms than for DRC firms. However, we find no significant difference in 
predicted flows from Kinshasa to Brazzaville relative to those in the reverse direction (see the 
coefficients  on  Kinshasa→Brazzaville  in  Table  9).  This  implies  that  trade  facilitation  between 
Kinshasa and Brazzaville would lead to a balanced expansion of trade flows in both directions. 
 
 
Results: Qualitative Findings 
 
The non-quantifiable survey answers shed additional light on the existing patterns of trade 
and transport, as well as the main constraints to the expansion of cross-border exchanges. 
They offer complementary insights into economic exchanges between Kinshasa and Brazzaville 
through the eyes of local operators. 
 
Brazzaville  is  currently  considered  a  negligible  market  for  most  firms  in  Kinshasa,  but 
responses  point  towards  large  untapped  trade  potential  overall,  and  towards  very  large 
untapped potential for formal trade. Of the 38 Kinshasa-based firms, only 17 declared significant 
sales  in  Brazzaville,  ranging  from  1  to  25  percent  of  turnover.  The  average  share  of  sales  is 
estimated at around 5 percent. Given that the population of Brazzaville corresponds to some 15 
percent of the population of Kinshasa, and that average income is higher in Brazzaville, this is 
another pointer towards unexploited trade potential between the two cities. 
 
As a result of excessive administrative costs most cross-river trade is partly or fully informal. 
Only two of the 17 Kinshasa firms who have significant client bases in Brazzaville export through 
official channels. The remaining 15 firms sell to their Brazzaville-based customers in Kinshasa and 
get their clients to ship the goods across Malebo Pool. Six Kinshasa-based firms declared that they 
had  either  exported  formally  to  Brazzaville  in  the  past  of  seriously  considered  doing  so,  but 
abandoned all such activity, citing excessive administrative costs including duties, paperwork and 
bribes.  Informally  traded  goods  are  smuggled  across  the  river  via  well  established  systems 
involving under-the-counter payments to various customs and security officials. Such trade occurs 
both on the ONATRA/CNTF ferries and on pirogues.   24 
 
The responses  to  the structured interviews  point towards  very  high trade barriers across 
Malebo  Pool..  Trade  barriers  are  not  only  implied  by  the  reported  low  levels  of  cross-border 
economic  activity  but  they  are  vividly  described  by  the  majority  of  our  interviewees.  These 
confidential responses offer us useful information for the description of barriers to cross-border 




4.  BARRIERS TO CROSS-BORDER INTEGRATION 
 
 
The cause of low cross-border economic activity is not an absence of latent trading potential 
but the existence of high cost to cross-border exchanges. In this Section, we seek to identify the 
specific constraints, focusing on transport across and along the river Congo. We considering the 




4.1  Malebo Pool: Choked by a Duopoly 
 
 
The Kinshasa-Brazzaville crossing offers the most important cross-border trade link in the 
Lower Congo region. If the cost of transport across Malebo Pool could be reduced, cross-border 
demand for local produce, which we have found in Section 3 to be more sensitive to trade costs than 
demand for overseas imports, is likely to rise too, thus stimulating economic activity on both sides 
of the river. This crossing connects the two nations’ capitals, with a combined population of around 
10 million, and both of which serve as hubs for their hinterlands (see Section 2). It therefore holds 
the key to facilitating trade of local produce between the two cities and countries. Moreover, a good 
transport  link  between  the  two  capitals  can  act  as  a  form  of  insurance:  with  ongoing  security 
concerns in Bas-Congo and in western RC regions, a good cross-river link allows both capitals to 
route their trade alternatively through Matadi or Pointe Noire – or, if needed, even through Luanda 
or Douala.  
 
All interviewed firms complained about excessive fares and taxes for crossing Malebo Pool. 
Accounting for the full range of fees, the cost of a return trip on the ferries is estimated at USD 
68.80  (see  Table  10).  However,  this  is  an  inevitably  imprecise  exercise.  Costs  stated  by 
interviewees vary widely, due largely to unpredictable and inconsistently applied schedules, to a 
multitude of fee-charging “services” with inconsistent presence and enforcement, and to widespread 
evasion and corruption. Most traders report the systematic payment of bribes to various officers 
(“dessous de table”), the net effect of which seems to be a reduction in the total cost to the traveling 
public. Furthermore, some of the administrative costs listed in Table 10 may not be incurred for 
every  trip,  and  disabled  passengers  travel  at  reduced  rates.  Frequent  traveler  discounts  are  not 
officially available. 
 
The cost of a return trip across Malebo Pool can be estimated at some USD 40, equivalent to 
between 40 and 80 percent of the average monthly income earned by Kinshasa residents.
24 
20,000  CFA  francs  is  the  standard  all-inclusive  price  stated  to  us  by  several  regular  travelers. 
Crossing by pirogue represents a slower and more hazardous alternative, which, according to the 
costs summarized in Table 10, still costs about half of a ferry crossing, mainly because of payments 
                                                 
24 From Table 1, we estimate an average monthly per-capita income in Kinshasa of approximately USD 50.   25 
claimed  by  police  and  military  officers.  To  put  this  figure  in  perspective:  San  Francisco  and 
Oakland are separated by a similar distance to that between Kinshasa and Brazzaville. If, relative to 
local average income, the same costs applied to crossing the Bay Bridge as those that currently have 
to be paid to cross Malebo Pool, San Francisco residents would pay between 1,200 and 2,400 
dollars for a return trip to Oakland. 
 
 
Table 10:  Estimated Cost of Passenger Crossing between Kinshasa and Brazzaville (in USD) 
             
  
From Kinshasa to Brazzaville  From Brazzaville to Kinshasa 
Ferry  Fast boat 
("canot") 
Dugout 




One-way fare  12.10  25.00  2.80  10.80  21.60  2.80 
Travel document (“laissez-passer”) 
at origin  5.00  5.00     5.90  5.90    
Search (“jeton fouille”) at origin  2.00 
2.00 
   2.00 
4.70 
  
Port fee (“redevance portuaire”) at 
origin   2.70     2.40    
Vaccination card at origin  1.60          
Various fees and taxes at 
destination  12.50  15.00     11.80  16.00    
Police/military at origin (“droit de 
passage”, “commisse” etc.)        4.70        9.80 
Police/military at destination (“droit 
de passage”, “commisse” etc.)        5.00        7.60 
Total  35.90  47.00  12.50  32.90  48.20  20.20 
Source: confidential survey of 57 trading firms in Kinshasa and Brazzaville. Prices converted using exchange rates of 
910 Congolese francs per USD and 510 CFA francs per USD 
 
 
Trading firms  consider  the  existing  transport  infrastructure  grossly  inadequate.  Only  two 
ageing ferries are in operation: ONATRA’s “Matadi” and a smaller vessel operated  by CNTF, both 
of  which  make  two  daily  return  trips.  Normally,  the  120-ton  “Matadi”  carries  some  2,000 
passengers a day, of which 600-700 pay a fare, and a small number of vehicles. However, the 
“Matadi” had to be taken out of service by the end of June 2010 and replaced with the smaller 
vessel  “Ikanda”,  because  of  safety  concerns,  further  reducing  capacity.  CNTF’s  ferry  is 
considerably smaller still. In recent years, the two ferry operators have granted a fixed number of 
concessions to private transport firms, who run small passenger speed boats (“canots”) between the 
two cities for a fee paid to the ferry operators (for which, they claim, they receive no services in 
return).  As  evident  from  Table  10,  the  prices  of  travel  in  fast  boats  are  prohibitive  for  most 
residents.  
 
Traders are frustrated by tight timetables and poor organization of the ferry ports. Officially, 
passenger traffic is allowed only between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. on weekdays and between 8 a.m. and 12 
p.m. on Sundays.
25 Some frequent travelers furthermore complain about unpredictable port closures 
due to passing politicians.  The  poor  organization  of  the  ferry  ports  (“Beaches”)  and  transport 
facilities adds to high transport costs and limited capacity. Traders and simple travelers are not 
treated  separately,  which  complicates  customs  procedures  and  increases  opportunities  for  rent 
                                                 
25 This is a severe constraint for delivery of fresh produce, forcing many traders to make night-time trips by dugout 
canoe. Furthermore, it makes it impossible for residents of one city to use the airport of the other city for flights arriving 
in the afternoon or evening. Long-time residents still remember the days when it was common to travel across the river 
and back for late-afternoon football matches.   26 
extraction  by  officials,  who  are  generally  described  not  only  as  corrupt  but  as  aggressive  and 
downright violent. Many of the traders who use the ferries complain about the absence of closed 
storage space for goods, exposing their merchandise to damage and theft. Female passengers in 
particular  complain  about  rough  treatment.  Discrimination  by  nationality  and  ethnicity  is  also 
reported. The intensity of official harassment (“tracasseries”) also seems to vary across different 
types of merchandise, with some goods, such as sugar, less subject to extortionary pressures than 
others. Despite the heavy-handed controls, a large number of “clandestins” find their ways onto the 
ferries, sometimes in turn disturbing regular travelers and leading to overcrowding. 
 
Shipping goods across Malebo Pool is very costly as well. Given differences across different 
types of goods and inconsistent application of fee schedules, it is even more difficult to extract a 
cost estimate for goods transport from the survey responses we collected than it is to estimate the 
cost of passenger crossings. Costs reported by traders range from 3 to 30 percent of FOB values. 
The World Bank (2010) calculated an estimate of USD 15 per ton for barge transport and USD 26 
for border delay costs. High costs of goods transport result from the necessary changes in the mode 
of transport, problems with dredging the ports, and the fact that only a few ports on the Kinshasa 
side are allowed to transport goods to Brazzaville. Some of these ports urgently need infrastructure 
investments as handling equipment is inefficient or lacking. However, administrative hurdles appear 
to represent the main cost factor. Private ports that are allowed to transport goods across Malebo 
Pool belong to the ONATRA port in terms of customs administration, and consequently suffer from 
similar administrative delays.  
 
The observed high prices and low capacity largely result from the duopoly granted to the two 
national operators, ONATRA, and the CNTF. A convention signed by the two governments 
under the auspices of CICOS in 2005 attributes exclusive rights over the Brazzaville-Kinshasa route 
for passenger traffic to the two state-owned transport companies.
26 Objections to the duopoly go 
beyond purely economic reasons. In the words of one high-ranking Brazzaville government official: 
“il est aberrant que deux soci￩t￩s se partagent un fleuve qui appartient à tout le monde”. Despite 
their officially sanctioned privileges, the two operators appear to be unable finance maintenance and 
infrastructure investment out of their revenues from river-crossing traffic (see Box 1). The main 
reason  behind  high  prices  and  inadequate  infrastructure  therefore  appears  lie  in  uncompetitive 
market structure coupled to poor management of the dominant operator. Box 2 shows that the 
situation at Malebo Pool is not unique in this regard. 
 
 
Box 1: ONATRA and CNTF 
 
Despite its dominant position, ONATRA claims not to be able to finance any investment projects 
out of its river-crossing operations. It can be estimated that ONATRA’s daily operating profit from 
the Malebo-Pool ferry service alone exceeds USD 5,000, thus probably earning the firm some 2 
million dollars annually. The port at Matadi, which is also run by ONATRA, is believed to generate 
even larger operating margins. The problem, according to the firm’s management, is a top-heavy 
and bloated payroll of some 12,500 employees plus a similar number again of pensioners, for all of 
its operations. Some of this is undoubtedly a legacy of busier pre-war times, but it does not appear 
that the firm has proper control over its entire payroll. What is clear, however, is that this overblown 
personnel budget as well as various forms of government interference, prevent ONATRA not only 
from offering the best customer service (an unlikely outcome anyway, given its monopoly status) 
but even from maximizing its own profits. It would appear very likely that investing some of its 
revenues  in  upgrading  its  transport  and  loading  capacity  would  benefit  its  own  profits  in  the 
                                                 
26  “Convention  d’exploitation  du  Pool  Malebo  entre  la  République  du  Congo  et  la  République  Démocratique  du 
Congo”.  Signed  on  22  November  2005.  Another  state-owned  enterprise,  SOCATRAF,  seems  to  hold  an  official 
monopoly over upriver traffic to Bangui.   27 
medium term, as the firm seems to operate well below the capacity at which its marginal cost equals 
its marginal revenue. 
 
The situation at ONATRA’s Brazzaville-based equivalent CNTF seems to be very similar. Despite 
high  operating  margins,  the  firm’s  management  claims  that  no  re-investable  profits  can  be 
generated. Discussions are said to be under way for the privatization of CNTF, but real progress 
does  not  look  imminent.  The  European  Union  is  poised  to  invest  EUR  10  million  in  the 
rehabilitation of the Port of Brazzaville (PABPS), and EUR 5 million in the dredging of its access 
channel by the joint RC and CAR river authority SCEVN. 
 
 
Trade and transport in the Lower Congo region generally appear to be hampered more by 
constraints on competition than by deficiencies in transport infrastructure. Transport costs are 
high not only on the Congo river. The World Bank (2010c) finds that the largest obstacle to cross-
border  commerce  is  posed  by  costly  transport.  For  a  representative  consignment  imported  to 
Kinshasa via the harbor at Matadi, for instance, the World Bank (2010c) estimates that harbor fees 
amount to some 40 percent of the FOB value, while road transport from Matadi to Kinshasa adds 
another 90 percent of the FOB value. We do not know how much of the high transport cost is due to 
poor infrastructure and how much is due to a lack of competition among haulers. However, there 
are good reasons to expect constraints on competition to be key. The port of Matadi is run by 
ONATRA, who exploit their quasi-monopoly over DRC overseas imports by charging steep fees. 
The road from Matadi is reported to be in reasonable condition (Vircoulon and Lagrange, 2008), 
and the railway line is also operational. It must be suspected that the steep prices are due to some 
extent to informal payments owed and hefty profits earned by haulage companies – factors found by 
Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009) generally to contribute more to high transport prices in Sub-
Saharan Africa than poor transport infrastructure. These high costs further constrain the scope for 
transit trade that would allow the Matadi-Kinshasa, and Pointe Noire Brazzaville corridors to fully 
compete to supply the Kinshasa/Brazzaville conurbation. 
 
 
Box 2: Inefficient Ferry Operation at Simi Simi 
 
We have studied an important crossing of the Congo tributary river Lindi at Simi Simi, some 10 
kilometers west of Kisangani. That ferry too was donated by the EU in 2008 and is now operated by 
the public agency Office des Routes. The price of crossing is USD 30 or 30 liters of fuel. Activity is 
commensurately infrequent, with at most three to four rotations per day (mostly carrying vehicles of 
NGOs, University of Kisangani researchers, doctors and district officials). The ferry sometimes 
goes for entire weeks without making a single crossing. The majority of travelers therefore cross by 
paddle dugout canoe. This seems to be another example of excessively high pricing by a monopoly 
operator choking off traffic. And, given the potential for trade between Kisangani and the rural 
areas to its west, it represents another economically costly transport bottleneck - due to a market 
inefficiency rather than to a lack of physical infrastructure. 
 
 
Customs procedures Kinshasa and Brazzaville border posts are reported to be cumbersome. 
While, in the DRC, some limited improvements have occurred recently with the introduction of the 
one-stop “guichet unique” at Matadi and N’Djili (see World Bank, 2010c), this system has not yet 
been introduced at the Beach in Kinshasa. There is also no preferential trade agreement between the 
two Congos even though both are member of ECCAS (see  Box 3). This means that all goods 
transported across the river in principle have to pay the full customs duties. The number of agencies 
and institutions involved at ports is in direct contradiction to a Presidential decree of 28 March, 
2002, stating that only OFIDA (now DGDA), OCC and DGM are entitled to be present on official   28 
border posts. However, up to 17 agencies are said to operate at the Beach Ngobila in Kinshasa. The 
DRC’s main employer organization, FEC, has repeatedly brought the issue of paying fees without 
corresponding service to the attention of the Ministry of External Trade. Fear of foregoing income 
opportunities and relevance has led to strong resistance by relevant agencies to withdraw from 
border sites in line with the Presidential decree. 
 
 
Box 3: DRC Trade Policy 
 
The DRC’s official schedule of import duties consists of four tariff bands of 0, 5, 10 and 20 
percent with a simple average of 12.3 percent. Tariffs for raw materials and intermediate 
products are lower than those for consumer goods, while capital goods are taxed with lower rates of 
7.4 percent on average according to the statutory rates. Changes to the tariff schedule are made 
upon proposal by the Tariff Committee to the Ministry of Finance.  
 
The simplicity and moderation of the statutory tariff code is offset by a range of additional 
border levies, customs delays and bureaucratic vagaries. In fact, customs duties represent only a 
relatively small share of the administrative and economic costs of importing to or exporting from 
the DRC. Excise duties are levied on numerous products at the ports, and imports have to pay a 
sales (turnover) tax of between 3 and 13 percent. More importantly, various agencies present at 
border posts collect  a multitude of levies cloaked as “service fees” even though corresponding 
services are not necessarily rendered (for more detail see World Bank, 2010c).  
 
DRC  is  a  member  of  three  regional  integration  organizations  but  shows  only  limited 
commitment  and/or  capacity  for  implementing  regional  integration  initiatives.  DRC  is  a 
member of, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Common Market for 
Eastern  and  Southern  Africa  (COMESA),  and  the  Southern  African  Development  Community 
(SADC). All neighboring countries in the West (Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, 
and  Angola)  are  also  members  of  ECCAS.  They  too  are  members  of  multiple  other  regional 
integration organizations. DRC has repeatedly asked SADC for moratoria on FTA implementation. 
Similarly, DRC has asked for moratoria to implement any COMESA commitments. 
 
In principle, the ECCAS free trade area should facilitate cross-border trade in the Lower 
Congo region, but effective economic implementation remains limited here as well. ECCAS is 
one of the pillars of regional integration identified by the African Union and was established in 
1993 between the members of CEMAC and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States 
(CEPGL), as well  as Sao Tome and Principe. Angola joined in 1999. However, the envisaged 
removal or tariffs on intra-regional trade are yet to be implemented, with ratification by the DRC 
still pending.  
 
The establishment of full customs unions looking rather unlikely in the near term, the DRC 
could currently start by implementing preferential free trade for locally produced goods with 
regard to all regional integration agreements. Coordination among the three DRC ministries 
(Ministry of External Trade, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry for Regional Cooperation) involved 
in such negotiations is weak. Currently, the Ministry of Finance through DGDA seems to be the 
most active branch of government in this matter. Partially encouraged or motivated by the ongoing 
negotiations among the former ACP states and the EU on asymmetric free trade agreements, some 
consolidation in these regional arrangements is currently on the agenda. DRC is negotiating an 
agreement  with  most  but  not  all  ECCAS  members.  However,  there  seems  to  be  considerable 
political private-sector willingness in DRC to focus regional integration efforts on SADC. While 
SADC and COMESA (and the EAC) are moving closer together through the Tripartite FTA, the 
DRC will ultimately have to decide whether it will join a Tripartite or an ECCAS customs union.    29 
 
 
Inefficient administrative procedures encourage the levying of “facilitation payments”. Such 
payments may lower actual border costs below the statutory level (to the extent that statutory fee 
tariffs are even published), but they still raise border costs beyond the cost of customs duties, they 
reduce income for public purse, and they offer substantial competitive advantages to well-connected 
traders.  Exemptions  are  often  granted  on  an  ad  hoc  basis,  with  DRC  customs  estimating  that 
exemptions amounted to almost 30 percent of tariff revenue in the first half of 2009 (World Bank 
2010c). 
 
Cumbersome  procedures  have  to  be  incurred  in  Matadi  as  well  as  in  Kinshasa,  further 
reducing the scope for transit trade - and consequently for competition along the two supply 
corridors to the Kinshasa/Brazzaville agglomeration. Substantial costs are incurred at Matadi port 
and  along  the  transport  corridor,  even  though  the  transit  arrangements  for  goods  destined  for 
Brazzaville seem to work reasonably well.
27 Border levies can easily represent an additional 15 
percent of duty on top of customs duties, excise duties, and turnover tax. Taken together, these costs 
are estimated to increase the costs of a representative shipment more than three times by the time it 
arrives in Kinshasa. According to the World Bank (2010c), handling fees at Matadi are some 50 to 
100 percent higher than in comparable African ports, and transshipment costs from Pointe Noire to 
Matadi on smaller vessels drive up import costs further.  
 
 
4.2  Kisangani: How It Could Work 
 
 
Kisangani,  a city located on either side of the Congo  river but not divided by a national 
border, offers a useful point of comparison to Malebo Pool. As we have shown, entry into the 
transport market across Malebo Pool is tightly restricted, red tape and mismanagement at river ports 
abound, and the costs of crossing are commensurately high. This is not an inevitable state of affairs 
for river crossings in central Africa, as a comparison case study for the second-most important 
crossing  of  the  Congo  river,  at  Kisangani,  shows.  Kisangani  has  an  estimated  population  of 
somewhat  over  800,000,  making  it  around  a  twelfth  the  size  of  Kinshasa-Brazzaville.  While 
Kinshasa-Brazzaville marks the western end of the main navigable reach of the Congo, Kisangani 
lies at its eastern extremity, at the foot of rapids. We base this section on a detailed report written by 
Yves Birere. 
 
Cross-river passenger traffic in Kisangani is 175 times larger  in per capita terms than in 
Kinshasa-Brazzaville.  In  Kisangani,  it  is  common  for  traders,  school  children,  students  and 
workers commute across the river on a daily basis - something which has been unheard of between 
Kinshasa and Brazzaville for decades. The estimated number of passenger river crossings for 2009 
is 10.2 million. For comparison, our estimate of the number of trips across Malebo Pool is 0.7 
million.  
  
Crossing the river Congo in Kinshasa-Brazzaville is about 300 times more expensive than 
crossing it in Kisangani, and the river in Kisangani is open for legal crossing twice as long 
every day as on Malebo Pool. All official operators in Kisangani apply a flat fare of CDF 100 per 
                                                 
27 Officially, goods in transit do not pay the DRC turnover tax (impôt sur le chiffre d’affaires, ICA) but have to pay for 
handling, unloading, and transport. When transit goods are transported by operators approved for bonded truck delivery 
(“Transporteurs agr￩￩s de transport sous douane”), no bond has to be paid. When transit consignments are transported 
by another operator, a bond calculated as the estimated customs duty plus 25 percent needs to be paid. This bond is then 
reimbursed to the transit company once the customs office at Brazzaville confirms to the DRC customs office that the 
goods have arrived. It is unclear how long it takes before such bond payments are reimbursed to transit transporters.   30 
person and crossing. No additional charges apply, and bureaucratic obstacles seem to be minimal 
both at embarkation and at disembarkation. Yet, the river is only about six times wider in Kinshasa 
than in Kisangani. In Kisangani too, some passengers, called “les ayants droit”, are exonerated from 
paying the fare. These include the disabled, the police, soldiers, nurses and Red Cross workers. 
While  disabled  travelers  according  to  some  estimates  account  for  two  thirds  of  passengers  in 
Kinshasa-Brazzaville, their share in Kisangani is estimated at some ten percent. This shows that 
river crossing is significantly more affordable to the general population in Kisangani than it is on 
Malebo Pool. (For details on the organization of river-crossing traffic in Kisangani, see Box 4.) 
 
 
Box 4: Crossing the Congo at Kisangani 
 
More than 96 percent of crossings are made by motorized dugout canoe, with less than 4 
percent of passengers crossing by ferry. In November 2010, some 60 canoes were in operation on 
any single day, with the whole fleet divided into two groups, allowed to operate on alternating days. 
Dugouts depart on average every ten minutes, between 5.45 a.m. and 10 p.m. Passengers pay CDF 
100 for a crossing on the ferry as well, whereas vehicles are charged USD 30 for a same-day return. 
Some 3,000 vehicle return trips are recorded per annum. The ferry operates from 7 a.m. until 6 p.m. 
The  public  agency  “Office  des  Routes”  operates  a  passenger  ferry  and  a  car  ferry,  and  the 
association of private operators ANAFLUKIS coordinates a fleet of some 140 motorized dugout 
canoes. 
 
Even  though  river-crossing  traffic  is  significantly  cheaper,  more  frequent  and  less 
cumbersome in Kisangani than in Kinshasa-Brazzaville, the river-crossing transport market 
in Kisangani is not free either. Both prices and quantities are controlled. Fares are set by the 
mayor’s office (“Hôtel de Ville”) and the National Economics Ministry (“Minist￨re de l’Économie 
Nationale”). Entry is costly: every canoe operator has to be affiliated with ANAFLUKIS, which 
costs a hefty USD 500 to join, plus a daily fee of CDF 2,600. Furthermore, ANAFLUKIS restrains 
the number of operators at any given time, by forcing canoes to work only every second day. This 
arrangement is clearly lucrative for operators. It can be estimated that daily operating profits per 
canoe (after fuel costs and fees) are at least USD 25. Furthermore, ANAFLUKIS evidently makes 
significant revenues, the destination of which we were not able to establish. Finally, ANAFLUKIS 
are forced by the mayor’s office to buy most of their fuel at above-market prices. This is another 
source of economic rents, whose final beneficiaries are unknown to us. 
 
The ferry operator seems to earn considerable profits but fails to invest in maintenance and 
repairs  with  likely  very  high  return  on  investment.  Our  estimates  suggest  that  the  ferries 
generate an annual operating profit somewhere between USD 120,000 and 390,000. Nonetheless, 
the operator “Office des Routes” claims to lack the means for financing maintenance, let alone 
investment. In fact, the car ferry, which was donated by the EU in 2008, has been broken since June 
2009. Since then, it crosses the river towed to the passenger ferry, which significantly reduces 
carrying capacity. We have reason to believe that the engine breakdown was due to chronically low 
fuel  levels  in  the  tanks,  which  can  easily  damage  diesel  engines.  Apparently  some  fuel  gets 
siphoned off and sold at a premium on street markets. The cost of repairing the broken engine is 
estimated at less than USD 20,000. We were unable to establish what happens with Office des 
Routes’ profits from the ferry operation. 
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4.3  Upriver Transport: Natural and Man-Made Hazards 
 
 
Improved  conditions  for  river-based  trade  in  Kinshasa  and  Brazzaville  could  also  revive 
upriver trade, thereby promoting the economic development of the capitals’ vast hinterlands. 
Of Kinshasa’s 50-odd ports, most are primarily used for upriver transport. Total traffic on the river 
seems to have decreased in recent years and shifted from ONATRA’s vessels and ports to private 
operators (Peters, 2010). Vessels are usually heavily overloaded, and severe accidents are common. 
The length of upriver rotations has increased substantially as maintenance of the river systems has 
deteriorated. For example, while historically it took ONATRA about 15 days to travel to Kisangani 
from Kinshasa (with an approximate return journey downriver taking 5-7 days), it now takes a 
month or more for such a trip. 
 
River-based transport could be cheap and efficient but requires some investment. The DRC 
river system is estimated to comprise 25,000 km of navigable waterways, of which 15,000 are 
classified as “known”. These 15,000 km of river system are used in their natural state with the 
exception of 2,668 km that are in principle maintained by RVF. However, the condition of the 
principal  river  connections  (Kinshasa  to  Kisangani,  on  the  Kasai  to  Ilebo,  and  to  Kikwit)  has 
deteriorated sharply over the last 20 years. Rivers are not sufficiently dredged, channels and sand 
banks are not clearly marked, and signs are not illuminated, indicating that RVF is not fulfilling its 
mandate. As a result, ships often can only circulate during the day and in the rainy season. RVF 
currently have an annual budget of between 5 and 8 USD million but claim that they would need a 
budget of 15-20 USD million to maintain the river network. Their equipment consists of one very 
small ship with a dredge, as well as seven ships - of which two are operational - that can be used to 
mark the river with buoys and signs that are often fixed to trees. RVF seem to face similar problems 
as other public agencies with regard to high personnel costs and pension liabilities.  
 
Administrative  hassle  and  insecurity  are  major  obstacles  to  upriver  traffic.  In  addition  to 
insufficient dredging and marking, boats sailing upriver seem to have to stop frequently and have to 
pay bribes to continue their journeys. Officially, there is no regulation that would demand boats to 
stop along their journey unless they wanted to stop or needed to charge fuel. However, in reality 
there seem to be at least five agencies that cooperate in extortion, approaching traveling ships on 
small speedboats that belong to the Force Navale: the Commissariat fluvial, the DGM, Services 
spéciaux (effectively some kind of police inspecting cargos for arms), Force navale, and the secret 
service (DEMIAP). While no payment is required for the control of documents, delays due to these 
“controls” seems to depend on the amount of informal payments made, and can range from five 
minutes to two hours and possibly more. The Commissariat fluvial is mandated to check for the 
captain’s  certificate  as  well  as  the  accuracy  of  the  “carnet  de  bord”  regarding  tonnage  and 
passengers. It is less clear whether they also have the mandate (or are allowed) to stop and control 
boats during their journey.  Due to the politically sensitive situation in the Equateur province, there 





5.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
In line with recent World Bank recommendations, we advocate a policy focus on small but 
concrete  measures  within  a  “natural  neighborhood”.  The  2009  World  Development  Report 
(World Bank, 2008) stresses regional integration in Africa as a key component of strategies aiming 
to foster export capacity and development. Regional integration is defined in a sense that goes well   32 
beyond trade policy measures, as “cooperation between countries in trade, domestic regulations and 
policies,  regional  infrastructure,  and  other  cross-border  initiatives,  including  public  goods  [...] 
within a neighborhood of countries” (p. 260). It goes on to point out that “[t]here is no shortage of 
international  agreements.  But  these  agreements  are  often  poorly  implemented,  [and]  their 
effectiveness tends to be low” (p. 278). As an alternative to grand multilateral treaties, the report 
advocates small but concrete integration measures within “natural neighborhoods” (p. 279). The 
experience  of  the  European  Union,  which  started  with  co-operation  agreements  on  specific 
economic  activities  among  a  small  group  of  neighboring  countries,  is  taken  as  a  motivating 
example: “[i]nteractions between neighboring areas or cities across countries can [...] provide the 
base  for  broader  integration  –  a  form  of  transfrontier  regionalism  that  could  follow  European 
models. Sub-Saharan Africa has many pairs of large cities that are near each other but separated by 
national borders. This carries hidden economic costs that can be overcome through cross-border 
agreements.” (p. 279). It is in this spirit that we seek to identify concrete interventions to facilitate 
economic exchanges across and along the river Congo. We focus mainly on DRC decision makers. 
 
It is generally recognized that considerable scope remains for trade facilitation in the Lower 
Congo region. For the DRC, the World Bank (2010c) has identified a range of actions concerning 
statutory trade impediments as well as the implementation of trade policy that could serve to reduce 
trade barriers significantly.
28 New export opportunities for manufacturing enterprises in Kinshasa or 
the planned export processing zone in the vicinity of Kinshasa will critically depend on less costly 
linkages with regional markets and secure access to deep water ports, of which Pointe Noire is 
currently the closest. 
 
 
5.1  General Cross-Border Transport and Trade 
 
 
We first formulate some policy recommendations that concern DRC policy in general, and are thus 
applicable in the Western region just as they are elsewhere in the country. 
 
 
Regulatory and Administrative Measures 
 
First and foremost, our analysis points to the importance of customs reform. This has been 
spelt out very clearly in the recent DTIS (World Bank, 2010c). A central element of such a reform 
are  the  systematic  implementation  of  single  clearing  and  payment  points  for  traders  (“guichet 
unique”). A  corollary of this  is  a significant  reduction in  the number of public or semi-public 
agencies (or even private agents) active at border posts and allowed (or at least tolerated) to collect 
fees from traders. The Presidential decree of 28 March, 2002, stating that only four agencies are 
allowed to operate at border posts, should be enforced. 
 
An area for reform of particular interest to the Western region is the organization of transit 
trade. Leakage and fraud in transit trade should be minimized. Transit could be further facilitated 
by  more  intensive  collaboration  between  DRC  and  RC  customs  offices,  and  the  modalities  of 
charging (and reimbursing) turnover tax (ICA), or the new value added tax that will replace the 
ICA, should be improved.
29 
 
                                                 
28 Somewhat soberingly, the problems identified and policy recommendations made in World Bank (2010) are very 
similar to those of a comparable analysis carried out two decades earlier, in the final period of the Mobutu régime 
(Word Bank, 1991). 
29 A law for creating a value added tax system has been passed in 2010.   33 
Improving law and order along the river Congo could go a long way towards unlocking the 
potential of that natural economic artery. This formerly lively trade route is now beset by all 
sorts of “services” and agencies claiming authority over the river and extracting taxes from passing 
traders  and  passengers.  This  not  only  has  a  financial  cost  for  shipowners,  it  can  also  imply 





Infrastructure  improvements  are  needed  throughout  the  DRC,  but  the  payoff  to  such 
investments could be particularly high in the Lower Congo region, where population density 
is high and distances are comparatively short (see World Bank, 2010a). We have identified the 
Matadi-Kinshasa and Pointe Noire-Brazzaville corridors not only as the gateways to the world for 
the two capital cities but also as corridors that could be in competition and thereby reduce costs and 
barriers along those corridors. In addition, they could function as mutual “fall-back options” for the 
case of interruptions to one of those routes. Hence, each country’s maintenance of its access route to 
the ocean generates external benefits to the other country. Work on the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville 
road is already underway, and upgrades to the rail link are in the pipeline. The Matadi-Kinshasa 
road is in passable condition, but does not seem to offer the capacity for significant increases in 
trade volumes. An upgrade of the Matadi-Kinshasa rail link could therefore pay rich economic 
dividends. Such an investment should be coupled with organizational reform of ONATRA, either in 
the form of privatization or by issuing concessions for other operators to use the railway tracks.  
 
Dredging and signposting along the river and in the Pool area are badly needed. In conjunction 
with the security and administrative improvements needed for a facilitation of upriver trade, such 
physical  improvements  could  be  a  relatively  low-cost  means  of  opening  up  the  vast  interior 
hinterland  to  international  trade.  The  current  situation  is  so  severe  that  economic  operators  in 
Kisangani have turned to supply routes through the port of Mombasa. 
 
Infrastructure  investments  will  have  to  be  complemented  by  sustainable  mechanisms  for 
maintenance. Currently, physical capital is largely left to depreciate without any local investment 
in  maintenance  or  replacement.  While  it  is  understandable  that  much  of  the  region’s  initial 
infrastructure investments are foreign funded, the maintenance of new and existing physical capital 
will have to be locally funded to be sustainable in the long term. We have experienced several 
instances of foreign-donated capital goods (especially ferries) that undoubtedly generate significant 
economic rents but are nonetheless allowed to depreciate while the use of the profits generated 
cannot be verified. 
 
It is important that projects to facilitate trade are made compatible with the incentives of 
local actors to serve the interests of the many rather than those of the few. As long as foreign-
financed transport capital is captured for rent extraction by local elites while being left to degrade, 
such investments will not yield sustainable gains - and they may even add to local distributive 
tensions. As a general rule, this aim is probably better served with regulatory and administrative 
interventions aimed at freeing local initiative and competitive forces rather than with large foreign-
financed and foreign-planned capital projects. 
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5.2  Kinshasa-Brazzaville: Unblocking the Bottleneck 
 
 
The proposed construction of a road-and-rail bridge between Brazzaville and Kinshasa is 
fraught  with  political  difficulties.  A  bridge,  combined  with  an  upgrade  of  the  Pointe  Noire-
Brazzaville corridor and, possibly, of the road and/or rail link between Kinshasa and Ilebo, has an 
estimated internal rate of return of 16 percent for the DRC and of 3 percent for the RC (World 
Bank, 2010a). It would offer the lowest-cost transport between the two capitals in a physical sense, 
granting Kinshasa and its hinterland improved access to the existing and expandable deep-water 
port of Pointe Noire, potentially obviating a large share of the current transshipments from Pointe 
Noire to Matadi. However, even though the economic gains would seem to be larger for the DRC, 
the intra-national distribution of gainers and losers is such that enthusiasm for the bridge is in fact 
strong in the RC but limited in the DRC. The main appeal from the vantage point of RC authorities 
is increased utilization of their transport infrastructure (port, rail, road) and the attendant scope for 
revenue collection. Conversely, the main source of hesitation on the DRC side is strong opposition 
from the political elite in the Bas-Congo region, which fears the loss of its current status as the 
nation’s main access point for merchandise trade and the loss of revenues and jobs related to port 
handling, transit fees on road infrastructure, and substantial losses in terms of unofficial payments.  
 
Given the large cost and uncertain prospects associated with the bridge project, less costly 
and more rapidly implementable solutions to unblocking the Kinshasa-Brazzaville bottleneck 
need to be identified.
30 The World Bank (2010a) has identified the Kinshasa-Brazzaville bridge as 
the potentially most beneficial infrastructure investment in terms of its impact on local production. 
However,  as  other  studies  have  shown  (Teravaninthorn  and  Raballand,  2009),  dilapidated 
infrastructure may be the visible face of high trade costs in Africa, but uncompetitive transport 
markets often pose even more severe obstacles to the free movement of goods and people and high 
administrative costs would have to be reduced to allow the full benefits of improved infrastructure 
to  materialize.
31  While  some  forms  of  transport  infrastructure  (roads,  dredged  waterways, 
navigation marks, ports) have public good character and therefore justify some degree of public 
investment and monitoring, there is no reason why shipping services cannot be left to private 
providers. In principle, the state would need to play only a minimal role, by regulating traffic, 
monitoring safety and protecting property rights. 
 
Travel  and  transport  across  Malebo  Pool  could  be  facilitated  through  a  range  of  mainly 
regulatory measures. If implemented effectively, such measures could generate similar benefits to 
those of a bridge, at a fraction of the cost. To the extent that such measures reduce administrative 
barriers to cross-border trade, they would of course also have to accompany any investment in a 
bridge across the river.  In fact,  facilitating the activities of local transport entrepreneurs  across 
Malebo Pool could well pay higher economic rewards than the construction of a bridge, since most 
of the work on a bridge would likely have to be carried out by foreign contractors, whereas water-
borne transport services can well be supplied by local operators. 
 
Unblocking the Malebo bottleneck with a combination of regulatory changes and some capital 
investment could yield significant economic gains for both countries, have symbolic value as a 
gesture of political good will, and represent a test case for trade reform. Since many regional 
                                                 
30 According to Keefer (2010), the fragmentation of DRC elites makes it very difficult to undertake and maintain large 
infrastructure projects: “The failure to construct the Kinshasa Brazzaville bridge is only one example of a critical 
infrastructure project that has large benefits for citizens generally, but is opposed by a few for either nationalistic or 
commercial reasons.” 
31 Of the estimated total freight cost of USD 40 per ton to cross Malebo Pool,  USD 26 relate to border delay costs, 
which a bridge would not necessarily to reduce. Addressing these costs alone  (even without building a bridge), could 
bring down transport costs between the two cities by 63%.   35 
integration treaties have remained dead letter and may be seen as political vanity projects by much 
of the population, some well-targeted interventions in Kinshasa and Brazzaville could offer visible 
advantages to a large number of citizens at relatively low cost. Implementation and enforcement 
may also be more effective right in the heart of the capital cities, where the central government has 
better control than in more remote border regions. Kinshasa and Brazzaville, therefore, are ideally 
placed  to  be  taken  as  a  test  case  for  reform  of  cross-border  transport  and  customs,  which,  if 
successful, could later be applied elsewhere. 
 
The first-best policy option would be to abolish the convention restricting passenger traffic 
across Malebo Pool, thus ending the stranglehold of ONATRA and CNTF on Pool-crossing 
passenger transport. Such a reform would include allowing free entry for “canotiers” to transport 
passengers  across  the  Pool.  Ideally,  market  liberalization  would  be  accompanied  by  more 
transparent and simpler procedures for immigration, customs, and related border controls. Transport 
of goods and passengers would be more clearly separated in order to reduce opportunities for rent 
extraction. Concessions for additional river ports to compete with the existing set of ports could be 
auctioned as a complement to these reforms.  
 
As a second-best solution, the establishment of a second pair of accessibly located “beaches” 
with independent transport operators could go a long way toward reducing transport prices 
and  limiting    opportunities  for  rent  extraction  by  port  agents  and  shipping  operators. 
Investments to allow modern, integrated, customs management ought to be at least co-financed by 
government  (agencies)  involved  in  these  operations.  Such  a  second  river  crossing  could  be 
restricted either to passenger traffic, with strict limitations on luggage; or it could be designed 
especially for the needs of small-scale traders.  
 
If such solutions were not politically feasible, initial measures to facilitate trade and passenger 
traffic could focus on a range of relatively simple administrative measures: 
o  enforcement  of  full  transparency  of  fares  for  passengers  and  goods  through  publicly 
available fare schedules 
o  enforcement of full transparency of all border and harbor fees and duties through publicly 
available schedules of the full range border taxes 
o  re-introduction of simplified customs duties for small transactions 
o  conducting a pilot trial of a single-fee model for passengers and/or goods (all border fees and 
duties consolidated into a single rate, collected at one counter, and then shared out among the 
relevant government agencies) 
o  a clearer separation of passenger and goods traffic at existing port facilities 
o  a  reduction  in  customs  controls  on  pure  passenger  traffic  to  infrequent  random  checks 
(made possible by the separation of passengers from goods traffic) 
o  enforcement of limitations to agencies allowed to operate at border points (implementation 
of the 2002 Presidential decree, allowing only four public agencies to intervene at border 
posts) 
o  extension of port opening hours and hours for river crossings  
These  reforms  would  best  be  undertaken  and  led  by  a  committee  under  the  leadership  of  the 
provincial  government.  Likewise,  the  provincial  government  would  have  to  be  empowered  to 
enforce relevant legislations such as the Presidential decree. 
 
Administrative  measures  could  be  coupled  with  auditing  and  reforming  ONATRA  and 
CNTF. The river-crossing transport operations should be spun off as separate entities, either as a 
private  or  as  semi-private  firms.  If  ONATRA  and  CNTF,  or  their  spin-offs,  were  expected  to 
continue to perform certain public services (to be rigorously defined and monitored), it could be 
envisaged that other operators pay some (modest) fees to compensate them for these mandated   36 
duties. If serious reforms of these public enterprises were undertaken, a case could also be made for 
external support, for example to settle pension claims and pay off redundant staff. 
 
Capacity restrictions on “canotiers” should be abolished or relaxed. This, in combination with 
setting up and monitoring of safety guidelines for the liberalized transport market, possibly under 
the  auspices  of  CICOS,  would  constitute  a  quickly  implementable  first  step  toward  improving 
passenger transport across Malebo pool. 
 
There is evident scope for simplifying travel for passengers and to facilitate formal trade of 
non-bulk products (i.e. those transported by individual traders). Much petty cross-border trade 
currently occurs informally by dugout canoe. If such traders were persuaded via trade facilitation 
measures to switch to formal trade channels, the public coffers would benefit, and trade could be 
more effectively monitored. Such trade facilitation measures should aim at:  
o  the assignment of separate terminals for simple travelers and for traders, possibly by 
opening  a  second  “beach”  in  each  of  the  two  capitals,  managed  by  private  operators,  as 
outlined above 
o  issuing of concessions to private operators for transport of small-scale traders 
o  upgrading of ferries to allow goods transport in better conditions 
 
An additional, more ambitious, and probably even more efficient approach, would be to limit 
border controls to the point of embarkation, by allowing the destination country’s agents to 
operate at the point of departure (similar to US controls at Canadian airports). If seriously supported 
by  the  two  governments,  external  technical  support  could  help  in  undertaking  such  steps.  By 
demonstrating  willingness  to  act  on  facilitating  economic  reform  across  Malebo  Pool,  the  two 
governments might also be able to signal their good intentions to international donors and thereby 




6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Our  report  highlights  the  strategic  economic  importance  of  the  Kinshasa-Brazzaville 
conurbation, both through its sheer population size and through its position as the regional 
transport hub. We have provided evidence to support the view of the river crossing between the 
two capitals as a major bottleneck: traffic volumes are small, transport costs are high, administrative 
obstacles abound, and cross-border differentials in retail prices are significant. 
 
We find bilateral official trade volumes between DRC and RC to be derisorily small. Formal 
trade between DRC and RC is lower now than in the 1980s. Recorded transit trade volumes are 
small too, mainly from Matadi to Brazzaville. However, we have also found evidence of significant 
informal trading activity. It is impossible to accurately quantify the volume such trade. 
 
We  observe  statistically  significant  price  differences  between  markets  in  Kinshasa  and 
Brazzaville. While we observe no significant price differentials within cities, shipping goods across 
the  river  appears  to  systematically  increase  retail  prices  in  both  cities.  This  points  toward 
unexploited arbitrage opportunities. 
 
We also find substantial potential for cross-border trade in locally produced goods, based on 
our company survey. We estimate that a general reduction in general trade costs would stimulate 
exports  even  more  than  imports,  and  thus  improve  the  trade  balances  of  DRC  and  RC.  Trade   37 
facilitation across Malebo Pool, through facilitating mainly trade in locally produced goods, holds 
particular promise for unlocking local productive potential. 
 
The costs of formal trade across Malebo Pool are very high, explaining low overall trade 
volumes and a lively informal trade. A return trip across Malebo Pool on a licensed vessel costs 
between 20 and 40 US dollars, i.e. 40 to 80 percent of the average monthly income earned by 
Kinshasa residents. The price of crossing the river at Kisangani is about 300 times lower than that 
of crossing at Malebo Pool. Costs of goods trade across Malebo Pool are estimated between 3 and 
30 percent of FOB values. Border delays and administrative costs account for around two thirds of 
those  costs.  Transport  capacity  for  passengers  and  small-scale  shipments  of  goods  is  severely 
limited and in poor state of repair. Border formalities are slow, complex and poorly administered. A 
multitude of agencies are present at border crossings in direct violation of presidential orders, which 
would restrict their number to four. Bribery, incivility and violence are rife. 
 
Passenger transport across Malebo Pool is controlled by a duopoly consisting of the two state-
owned transport operators ONATRA and CNTF. This duopoly is protected by a convention 
signed by the governments of DRC and RC under the auspices of CICOS. Private operators are 
allowed to offer their services only under a tight quota regime and subject to steep fees due to the 
duopolists. 
 
We  present  a  set  of  policy  recommendations  that  can  be  taken  as  complements  to  more 
general trade-facilitating reforms and as substitutes for the project of building a bridge to 
link Kinshasa and Brazzaville. In addition to simplifying customs procedures and making fare 
structures more transparent, we propose a liberalization of the transport market across Malebo Pool. 
Such measures would be comparatively cheap, they ought to be relatively easy to enforce given the 
proximity to the seats of government, they would yield large gains to the general population, and 
they could have high symbolic value as evidence of political goodwill between the two nations. 
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-  André Okemba (Directeur Général, Port Autonome de Brazzaville) 
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APPENDIX 2:   GOODS INCLUDED IN PRICE STUDY 
   42 
 











African shirt Chemise / Robe Bazin 1 unit 15.18 5 0 na
air conditioner Climatiseur, LG 1 unit 469.25 5 399.78 7 -14.8
artificial hair 
(Miss Rola)
Mèches Miss Rola 1 packet 4.93 8 0 na
artificial hair 
(Noble)
Mèches NOBLE 1 packet 13.03 5 0 na
baby powder Poudre Bébé, Jonson  250 g 2.06 11 1.57 7 -24.2
beer
N'gok, Primus, Turbo King 
(boisson)
65 cl 0 1.04 9 na
biscuits Biscuit Kwick 1 packet 0 0.20 9 na
body lotion Lotion Extra Clair 500 ml 1.46 10 2.18 7 49.3
butter (imported 
/ local)
Beurre Kerrygold / Marsavco 500 g 2.02 18 2.08 11 3.0
cabbage Choux ( 1 grosse boule) 1 kg 0 0.75 8 na
cassava flour Farine de Manioc 1 kg 0.56 7 0.61 10 8.7
cement Ciment / Cinat  50 kg 15.95 8 16.90 19 6.0
chicken Poulet (Wilki, local) 1 kg 4.65 12 3.56 22 -23.5
cooking oil
Huile végétale, Simba / 
Marsavco
5 litre 9.15 11 10.60 6 15.9
corned beef Corned beef, Exeter 340 g 2.28 12 2.54 9 11.5
detergent
Detergent Klin, Yambo, Saba, 
Le coq
1 litre 0 1.70 5 na
egg Œufs 1 plate 5.37 9 7.19 6 34.0
fabrics English 
Wax
Wax Anglais 6 yards 11.26 10 0 na
fabrics Soso Wax Soso 6 yards 10.11 10 0 na
green beans Haricot, vert 1 kg 3.17 8 3.01 4 -5.0
jeans Pantalon Jeans 1 unit 13.85 10 0 na
ladies' handbag Sac à mains 1 sac 6.70 2 0 na
liquid detergent Sumamous (Detergent liquide) 2.5 litre 0 4.56 5 na
maize flour Farine de Maïs 1 kg 0.54 8 0 na
milk powder Lait en poudre, Nido 400 g 4.44 12 4.50 11 1.4
mineral water Canadian Pure (Eau minerale) 1.5 litre 0.67 11 0.90 10 35.3
mobile phone
Télephone Portable, Nokia le 
petit
1 unit 28.74 12 47.81 7 66.3
notepad Cahier (Ragec et Bayo) 200 pages 0 0.68 11 na
palm oil Huile de Palme 5 litre 5.31 9 5.93 14 11.6
pilchards Pilchard GF, Apollo 425 g 1.60 12 0.73 7 -54.6
pineapple Ananas 1 kg 0 1.72 9 na
plantain Banane Plantin 1 kg 2.09 8 1.36 7 -35.1
plastic chair Chaise en plastic / Plastica 1 unité 7.46 9 9.74 8 30.5
potato Pomme de terre 1kg 2.69 8 2.43 7 -9.9
razor blades Rasoir Gilette, Nelson packet of 10 0.44 12 0.97 6 121.7
rice (imported / 
local)
Riz Lion / local 25 kg 16.84 19 26.24 9 55.8
sandals
Sandales / Babouches / 
Creppes
1 paire 8.01 8 0 na
sardines Sardine à huile, Anny 125 g 0.71 12 0.69 11 -3.3
sea fish Poisson de mer 1 kg 0 3.12 9 na
shoe polish Cirage, Kiwi / Bee & Flowour 40 ml 0.47 12 0.49 8 3.5
soap Savcongo 1 unit 0 0.48 5 na
spaghetti Spaghetti VEGA 500 g 0.82 12 0.52 11 -36.8
sugar cane Sucre, Kwilungongo 5 kg 5.78 12 6.20 17 7.2
sweet potato Patate douce 1 kg 1.39 8 0.88 5 -36.8
tinned tomato Tomate pelée 400 g 1.06 6 1.14 8 7.6
tomato Tomate fruit 1 kg 0.70 8 2.21 10 215.4
tomato puree Tomate concentrée, Salsa 70 g 0.18 12 0.24 11 33.0
toothpaste Dentifrice, Colgate 125 ml 1.18 12 1.37 8 16.2
TV set
TV Couleur "21 pouces", 
Samsung / LG
1 unit 203.37 12 208.66 8 2.6
vegetable 
cooking oil
Huile Rafinée, Avena 5 litre 7.46 12 11.08 8 48.4
ventilator Ventilateur Gd format, Crown 1 unit 29.14 12 30.51 11 4.7
washing powder Omo Bleu / Marsavco 500 g 1.48 18 2.37 11 59.8
wheat flour Farine de Froment / Midema 50 kg 44.93 9 44.14 13 -1.8
wine Baron Simon (vin) 1 litre 3.38 7 0 na
yoghurt Yaourt Bayo 12,5 cl 0 0.46 10 na
Average 17.3